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Abstract 
With its scarce budgetary resources and institutional logics favouring market-based problem-
solving, the European Union (EU) has been considered a prime example of the regulatory 
state. When and how can we expect the Commission to pursue aims beyond the mere increase 
of efficiency in private market transactions? Can we expect Brussels to intervene where 
societal interests demand re-regulation? 
We draw up two ideal-type perspectives on market regulation and trace them empirically 
along two regulatory processes concerning financial services: consumer credit regulation and 
equal treatment in financial services, selected as recent instruments focussing explicitly on 
presumably weaker parts in market transactions. Regulatory decisions are reconstructed along 
semi-structured interviews with Commission officials from different DGs and hierarchical 
levels conducted 2006-2009. 
In both cases the Commission went beyond mere market-efficiency and changed the quality 
of the financial market by favouring disadvantaged societal groups in its regulatory proposals. 
Our process analyses suggest that there is a scope for a regulatory equality enhancing policy 
which depends on pro-active agents within the Commission, the possibility to frame 
regulatory beneficiaries as market participants, and the re-distribution of rights instead of 
resources. 
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1. Introduction 
In the European Union (EU) limits for taxation and scarce budgetary resources severely 
restrict the realisation of wider social goals through redistribution. This is one of the reasons it 
has been characterized as the prime example of a regulatory state which focuses mainly on the 
correction of various market failures (Majone 1993). From this view, European regulation 
first and foremost pursues the goal of increasing the efficiency of the Single European 
Market. Yet, more recent approaches in the regulation literature stress that the traditional 
national welfare state may also contain regulatory elements (Mabbett 2009; Leisering 2011; 
Levi-Faur 2011). A regulatory mode of decision making must thus not necessarily be tied to 
the (political) goal of liberalization.  
Not the least, this is evident in the puzzling observation that particularly the European 
Commission is perceived as both a promoter of neo-liberal market-making on the one hand 
and a powerful regulator constraining business activity for wider social goals on the other. 
The nature of the Single European Market is highly relevant for the distributive outcomes the 
EU produces and market regulation may be a ‘vehicle for attaining distributive goals’ (Somek 
2006). It is relevant in analytical as well as practical respects to ask under what conditions the 
regulation of markets at the EU level follows wider social goals. 
In this paper, we argue that certain internal conditions create a wider re-regulatory capacity of 
the European Commission. While it remains limited to the regulatory section of the overall 
social policy spectrum, the Commission can and does initiate regulation that targets equality 
enhancement rather than improved competition alone. 
We show this along specific financial services regulations. Market efficiency is highly 
relevant for this policy field as financial service transactions are far from freely floating 
across national borders in the European Union. But not the least the financial crisis has shown 
that regulation of financial services strongly affects the pursuit of wider societal goals. Thus, 
financial services constitute a promising policy area for uncovering the re-regulatory capacity 
of the Commission and the factors that push it to regulate European markets in the name of 
wider social concerns. 
The article develops two ideal type perspectives on market regulation and situates them in the 
wider debate on European regulation (section 2). We then proceed by analyzing the 
preparatory processes of two financial services initiatives which explicitly went beyond the 
pursuit of more efficient markets. This first concerns legislation on equal treatment policies 
promoting opportunities for disadvantaged groups in service markets (3.1) and, second, a 
 2/21 
proposal on EU consumer credit regulation which actively countered asymmetries between 
buyers and seller in the internal market (3.2). The final section concludes by discussing 
central explanations for the respective Commission positions in the regulatory output as well 
as the potential impact on political outcomes (4). Thereby we can present hypotheses on the 
conditions under which the Commission itself exploits the leeway that is left for a more social 
European market. 
 
2. Conceptualising market regulation by the European Commission along market 
efficiency and wider social equality 
This article aims to contribute to the debate on whether and under what conditions Europe’s 
markets can be embedded ‘within a broader set of social and political rules and cultural 
understandings that make them work not only more efficiently but also more equitably, with 
greater security for market and nonmarket participants and in tune with a variety of other 
social purposes’ (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009: 579). Extant research on this question differs 
along two perspectives. Firstly, the implications of EU decision-making for national welfare 
state models are focussed. Here lacking social embedment of EU integration is explained 
along systemic features of supranational decision-making (Scharpf 1999, 2010). Our interest 
is more limited and rests with the re-regulatory capacity of day-to-day policy making in 
Brussels. In other words, in this article we accept the premise that the EU is a regulatory state 
with very limited capabilities for actually redistributive interventions (Majone 1993, 1996).  
A second dividing line in the literature runs between arguments about the natural or 
spontaneous emergence of market embedment and contributions highlighting the necessity of 
political construction to reach distributive goals. The former perspective is often evoked in 
relation to ECJ rulings in the area of anti-discrimination policies or cross border health care 
(Hervey and Trubek 2007; more critical Höpner and Schäfer forthcoming). We rather 
subscribe to the second perspective and argue that market embedding is no autonomous 
process but depends on specific conditions linked to decisive political actors such as the 
European Commission. 
Along these analytic decisions, we only cover the middle section on a larger social policy 
continuum. This continuum spans from completely unfettered markets on the one side to an 
authoritative distribution of resources along social justice criteria on the other side. Strictly 
speaking only some section in between these extremes is crowded with regulatory policy 
where authoritative intervention is based on rules stated in general terms. But also in this 
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section, the regulator will explicitly or implicitly decide on ‘who will be indulged and who 
deprived’ (Lowi 1964: 690-1). In this view, regulation makes a socially relevant difference 
(Braithwaite et al. 2007) and already the narrow section should bear crucial insights into the 
conditions under which a policy outcome will be situated more towards one or the other end 
of the entire social policy continuum. Even where we only look at regulatory means, the 
outcome might be markets of very different social quality.  
To make this claim empirically tractable, we start from a rough distinction of two ideal-type 
perspectives on the organisation and purpose of markets as a mode of social interaction: they 
may be either seen to produce the optimal allocation of resources in an equilibrium of 
economic supply and demand or as a socially constructed mechanism balancing competing 
values and demands.  
The classical perspective of welfare economics starts from the utility of individual actors in 
the marketplace. It assumes that the socially optimal allocation of resources is reached, where 
no individual can be made better off without disadvantaging others. Such a Pareto-efficient 
outcome is reached through the equilibrium of supply and demand which in turn can only be 
achieved in a perfectly competitive market where the individual market-participants try to 
maximize their individual welfare (Stiglitz 1986). Yet, even from this perspective some 
regulation is required to preserve the market (Weingast 1995), e.g. on property rights or 
contract certainty. In practice markets are hardly commensurate with a model of perfect 
competition, for example where information is asymmetrically distributed among the market 
participants (Akerlof 1970). Thus, classical welfare economics considers market regulation 
warranted where markets fail, externalities accrue or other imperfections prevail that prevent 
optimal decisions of individual market participants (see e.g.Majone 1996: esp. 28-30). In this 
perspective regulation is seen only as a second-best solution to the outcomes a fully 
competitive and undistorted market would produce. 
A second perspective on market regulation criticizes this economic view from normative 
points of departure (see Prosser 2006 or; McVea 2005). Approaches in this vein argue that 
market efficiency is qualitatively different from other, equally legitimate purposes of social 
interaction, such as social justice. Here the purpose of regulation is not to reach perfect 
competition in the market, but to alter their very quality by changing the rules under which 
market transactions will be carried out among individuals. Rather than guaranteeing the mere 
pursuit of individual welfare, regulation is addressing misallocation from a moral point of 
view and is thus seen as a ‘balancing of competing values setting out the sort of society we 
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wish to live in’ (Prosser 2006: 375). This is consistent with the distinction of economic and 
social regulation that has figured prominently in the US debate on regulatory market 
interventions (cf. Reagan 1987: esp. ch. 2). In the context of the EU this has also been 
described as ‘market cushioning policies’ (Sbragia and Stolfi 2008: 133; Sbragia 2000; 
similarly ‘market shaping’ Quaglia 2010). While economic regulation aims at freeing 
competitive forces, social regulation is primarily motivated by problems that often cannot be 
solved by an increase in economic competition alone. Rather than targeting the individual 
pursuit of welfare, social regulation aims at protecting broader societal groups from 
systematic disadvantages they may encounter in competitive markets (see for example 
Ramsay 1995 on consumer credit markets). 
So both ideal-type perspectives result in different models of regulation. While there might be 
fuzzy borderlines at times, the discussion yields the following ideal types of regulation:  
• In the first perspective – termed ‘efficiency enhancing’ – regulation is perceived necessary 
to increase the immediate functioning of markets by countering market-failures or 
imperfections understood as non-optimal transactions. Regulation should be expected 
were markets face a lack of competition due to monopolies, negative externalities or 
informational asymmetries. Beneficiaries of regulation are individual market participants. 
• In the second perspective – termed ‘equality enhancing’ – market-regulation is perceived 
necessary to deliver broader societal goals and operates with a more long-term perspective 
on market gains. Such regulation is motivated by other goals beyond increasing 
competition. Structurally weaker parts in market transactions are the addressed 
beneficiaries of regulation.  
This distinction is at odds with the seminal perspective on the regulatory state that is most 
often portrayed as the outright opposite of the positive (welfare) state (Majone 1997: 149). In 
this account the main function of the positive state is the Keynesian macro-economic 
stabilization and redistribution. Majone’s regulatory state in turn puts administrative and 
economic performance first – it is ‘efficiency enhancing’. In between these extremes, the 
‘equality enhancing’ perspective implies that there is a socially and analytically relevant 
middle ground. But what follows from Majone’s distinction for a ‘state’ model that starts with 
a clear (re)distributive function, yet is nevertheless not tied to budgetary concerns but operates 
through regulation?  
We argue that if the goals of the state differ as the original distinction of the ideal types 
suggests, then also the process of rule-making in the Commission should deviate from the 
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typical regulatory state model in at least four respects. First, in his seminal conceptualisation 
of the regulatory state, Majone argues that re-distributive consequences result from ‘potential 
policy constraints rather than policy objectives’ for regulators (Majone 1997: 162). In this 
efficiency enhancing world, actors within the Commission try to avoid costs for any market 
participant striving for a solution beneficial to all. In contrast, the equality enhancing 
perspective implies that internal actors will rather focus on the creation of benefits for 
particular market participants that may or may not imply costs for others – this is in line with 
taxing and redistribution under the positive state. Rather than a constraint, (re-)distributive 
consequences should become an objective of regulation in an equality enhancing model. 
Beyond, the envisaged structure of the regulation should differ. In an efficiency enhancing 
world, as many decisions as possible are delegated to the market participants themselves and 
‘indirect government’ best describes the mode of regulatory production as well as the 
regulatory contents (Majone 1997: 146-8). Opposing this, the equality enhancing perspective 
implies that rule-making by the market results in skewed outcomes so that the regulators will 
take many decisions themselves and try to set conclusive rules for the issue in question. 
Thirdly, both ideal types should differ along the integration of external stakeholders into the 
regulatory process. In striving for efficiency, Majone’s (1997: 158) regulatory state model 
implies competition among single issue interest groups. Following pluralist theory (Truman 
1951), regulators grant equal access to the different sides of the debate and act as neutral 
arbiters searching for the equilibrium solution. In contrast in the positive state corporatist 
patterns grant representational monopolies for some interests – access to the regulator is 
biased. Structured along the division of business and workers they focus mainly the area of 
labour (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). Under the equality enhancing model Commission 
officials should also cease to be neutral without, however, focussing only on the labour 
market. Where normative imbalances among pluralist contending interests are the starting 
point of regulation, regulators should rather grant privileged access for those groups whose 
interest they see specifically at stake. The equality enhancing model is thus more consistent 
with the neo-pluralist view on interest group integration (cf. Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987) . 
Lastly, both possible worlds of regulation should differ along the way actors within the 
Commission interact. In the seminal conception of the regulatory state, governmental actors 
‘usually cast their arguments in the language of 'regulatory science' rather than in the more 
traditional language of interest or class policies’ (Majone 1997: 157). Arguments should focus 
on technically ‘best’ solutions and actors should devote to ‘a problem-solving rather than a 
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bargaining style of decision-making’ (ibid.: 162). In contrast, the equality enhancing 
perspective emphasizes normative differences on the quality of markets and should thus be 
much more prone to political conflict and more fundamental political exchange among actors 
about the quality of markets in the Commission. 
Far from living up to strong hypotheses, this analytical framework guides our analysis of two 
concrete processes of policy formulation in the EU Commission. 
 
3. Empirical approach 
The analysis presented here is part of a broader project studying ‘Position formation in the EU 
Commission’ along 48 legal initiatives in different policy areas during the Prodi and the first 
Barroso Commission. It rests on data from semi-structured interviews with Commission 
officials from different Directorates-General and hierarchical levels as well as with organized 
interests conducted in Brussels between 2006 and 2009.1  
Against the preceding discussion, the dependent variable of interest is the extent to which a 
policy outcome is equality enhancing while the market failure perspective serves as our 
baseline expectation. Our endeavour here is an inductive one and the analytical starting point 
is the regulatory output,2 i.e. the final position the Commission showing a bias towards the 
equality enhancing perspective. With the aim to work backwards, we selected two cases from 
an ongoing broader project on position formation in the EU according to their clearly equality 
enhancing policy output. The directive on equal treatment in the access to and supply of 
goods and services between men and women, persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation addresses disadvantages of specific groups in financial 
markets, e.g. with respect to insurance contributions and benefits or the conditions for loans. 
In the other case creditor obligations for advertising, concluding and terminating credit 
agreements are targeted under the view that consumers – e.g. where over-indebted – are the 
weaker parts that have to be protected when it comes to market interactions on financial 
services. Tracing the position formation processes we uncover the enabling factors moving 
the rule-making towards the goal of equality-enhancement. Comparing the two drafting 
                                                 
1 The multi-annual, collaborative research project on ‘Position Formation in the EU Commission’ is 
conducted at the Social Science Research Center Berlin. Funding from the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully 
acknowledged and we are indebted to our colleague Julia Metz for fruitful discussions of the matters presented 
here. In order to preserve the assured interviewee anonymity, we refer to the interviews as “COM1”, “NGO2”, 
etc. For more information on the project see http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/peu/default.en.htm 
2 In this paper we focus on the Commission’s policy output first and cannot engage in a normative 
discussion nor can we provide final judgements on whether each and every goal was achieved. 
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processes – covering the equality of opportunity in service markets on the one hand, and 
consumer disadvantages in taking credit on the other hand – similarities in the policy 
formulation patterns can be identified. What pushes the Commission towards the more social 
end of the policy continuum? Do we find evidence that decision-making in the Commission 
deviates from the classical regulatory state model by following the logic of political benefits, 
neo-pluralist and intentionally skewed interest group access, and substantial internal conflict 
instead of efficiency enhancing problem solving?  
Any European market regulation must start with a policy proposal by the Commission which 
in turn defines the issues as well as the strategic preferences that govern inter-institutional 
negotiations (e.g. Princen 2009; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). But while the Commission is 
thereby able to set the agenda for European market regulation, its proposals themselves are 
produced by a multi-staged, multi-actor process which requires the internal aggregation of 
possibly deviating interests (Hartlapp et al. 2010). We thus understand the Commission as a 
multi-actor and apply a disaggregated view featuring different Directorates Generals as 
decisive actors. We find portfolios that subscribe to efficiency-enhancing policies such as the 
DG for competition policy (DG COMP) or for the internal market (DG MARKT), and others 
that cover regulatory areas typically associated with social policy. In this paper we in 
particular look at the Directorates-General for Employment, Social Affaires and Equal 
Opportunities (DG EMPL) and for Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO). Thus, if 
we want to explain the overall Commission position, we need to understand both the 
interaction of DGs and the formation of policy position within the DGs. The following 
sections analyses the interplay of the decision-making structure and the agency of political 
actors within the Commission in two specific policy areas. 
We start by briefly summarising the main regulatory positions taken by the Commission in 
relation to the respective status-quo. Thereby we outline whether enhanced efficiency or 
enhanced equality were pursued and in how reaching these aims was left to market 
participants or was accomplished by direct rule-setting. From there, we can establish the 
involvement of external interests as well as the style of interaction among the different 
Directorates-Generals. In sum we are interested in the factors that were decisive in assuring 
equality enhancing policies at an early stage of policy making inside the Commission. 
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3. Empirical cases 
A first case bearing insight to the re-regulatory capacity of the EU Commission is the 
promotion of equality of opportunity for disadvantaged groups in services and especially 
financial services. Traditionally, at the EU level anti-discrimination regulation had been 
developed as part of labour law. After the Amsterdam Treaty had introduced a new basis for 
legal action the Commission proactively sought to extend respective principles to other areas, 
including the (financial) service market. 
Here different life expectancies and varying behaviour and consumption between sexes and 
age groups had led to unequal treatment in terms of access to the insurance cover provided or 
in the level of benefits paid out. Such practices – most pronounced in motor, health and life 
insurance – might be considered efficient from a pure market point of view. Yet, they 
disadvantage societal groups along factors lying outside individual control. Legislation on 
actuarial factors differed starkly across Member States. The unisex principle was in place in 
Scandinavian countries, France and Slovenia. The UK also knew unisex tariffs in private 
health insurance, while strong differentiations prevailed for car insurance (cf. also Ireland, AE 
2004). 
Against this background in 2003 the Commission proposed a directive implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between women and men in the access to and supply of goods 
and services.3 In 2008 a more far reaching proposal was drafted by DG°EMPL. Still pending 
in front of the Council (cf. EUobserver 2010) it would broaden the quest for equal treatment 
of sexes in services to persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.4 .The new regulation renders insurance companies' practice of using sex, age, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation to calculate premiums (in principle) 
discriminatory.  For sure, where ‘accurate and up-to-date data’ (Commission of the European 
Communities 2008: 42) can assure that different tariffs are related to the profile of the 
customers and not to characteristics that are simply taken as a proxy they are still allowed. 
However, the proposal prescribed that in all other cases insurers and banks will no longer be 
able to use age, sex or disability in a way that discriminates against groups with these 
particular characteristics. This will increase costs both for insurers and for those consumers 
that hitherto benefitted from the unequal market relationship. What is more the very fact that 
                                                 
3 Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE implementing the principle of equal treatment between women 
and men in the access to and supply of goods and services (COM(2003)657). 
4 Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Commission proposal 
COM(2008)426). 
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the Commission intervenes to explicitly broaden the market to those that were by law or by 
practice left outside before underlines the goal to create more equal markets.5. . Clearly, 
redistributive consequences for societal groups were considered as an objective rather than as 
a constraint of regulatory decision-making. It is decisive in this respect that the directives do 
not only set substantial rules e.g. in view of the actuarial factors used or positive action, but 
also requires establishing judicial and/ or administrative procedures and penalties as well as 
enforcement bodies. In comparison to existing practices the regulatory structure of these 
directives yields greater involvement of the regulator in substance as well as a direct mode of 
governance in enforcement. 
In the run up to the negotiation process, DG°EMPL had very actively used and forged 
changes in interest group organizations to create a broad front against opposition from those 
that wanted to keep more expensive discrimination grounds out of the discussed acts. Already 
prior to the concrete drafting the Commission had incentivized existing and scattered NGOs 
to join forces in an umbrella organization which was not only consulted but substantially 
influenced the legislative proposal. ‘It was certainly strategic to involve civil society groups 
more than social partners […] We saw the potential victims of discrimination as being people 
who were at risk of some sort of social marginalisation as a result of discrimination, and they 
are the ones that tended not to have a voice in social partnership’ (COM151).6 Industry in 
contrast was consulted only to provide information that would allow the Commission to 
follow its goal of greater market equality. To gain a better understanding where technical 
requirements of risk-based assessments for capital adequacy end and individual business 
interests begin, the drafting DG°EMPL consulted industry early on (COM42:90 and 
COM19:306). On the basis of the acquired knowledge the Commission was able to argue that 
the question whether existing rules and practices had to be changed depends on the product 
and whether justification can be provided ‘on the basis of accurate and up-to-date data’ 
(Commission of the European Communities 2008: 42). The pro-active and selective 
distribution of access for interests from different societal segments by DG EMPL clearly 
contradicts the presumed neutral regulator a purely efficiency-enhancing model would imply.  
                                                 
5 This contrasts with equal treatment on grounds of nationality article 45 (39/48). It also contrasts with 
existing EU anti-discrimination policies based on article 157 (ex-article 141/119) requiring equal pay between 
sexes that addressed the employment relationship by strengthening the position of the weaker employer at work 
(or workplace related interactions). 
6 Interestingly DG°EMPL therewith departed from its traditional ally the social partners to include groups 
of a different ambit. They in turn presented parts of society that were not addresses of classical labour law. 
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Both the descision to have equal treatment legislation on financial services and the more 
concrete implications this would have for insurers in their actuarial practices were debated 
among central actors inside and outside the Commission reflecting substantial differences in 
the underlying understandings of markets. Inside the Commission DG°MARKT defended the 
positions of industry, ‘various financial sector federations’ (COM42:39) and those Member 
States were ‘the practice of differentiating insurance costs [...] were very, very strong. UK, 
Ireland, but also Germany’ (COM21:39) by trying to do ‘a damage limitation exercise’ 
(COM19:78). DG°ENTR was fundamentally opposed to have a binding act at all and 
especially a broad directive, because they did not consider this an appropriate issue to be 
tackled at community level and because they feared costs for enterprises (COM81:32-36, also 
44). For both actors inside the Commission the ideal regulatory position was for ‘insurance to 
be [kept, MH] completely out’ (COM21:75). In contrast, DG°EMPL holding the pen, was 
strongly in favour of the acts (COM21:30, Commissioner Diamantopoulou in Minder 2003a), 
but had to overcome opposition from the critical portfolios inside the Commission as well as 
from opposing Member States and organized interests. The factors that proved crucial for 
DG°EMPL to put its position through in these internal contentions allude to a political game. 
The point has been already made for the involvement of external actors (see above). In 
addition the agenda setting and gate keeping function of the lead DG was strategically used to 
favour the desired equality enhancing outcome. Knowing that it was difficult to oppose the 
quest for anti-discrimination policy from a political point of view and that thus the adoption of 
the far-reaching proposals would be benefiting from a decision at the political level of the 
Commission rather than from technical debates among desk officers the lead DG channelled 
the important decisions upwards. Open discussion at the political level could be exploited not 
least to the personal capacity of the Commissioner to convince the College (Hartlapp 2011). 
What is more ECJ cases – often triggered by the very interest group organizations DG°EMPL 
supported financially (COM152) – where used as argumentative support to rebuff opposing 
views inside and outside the Commission (e.g. Marshall C-152/84 [1986], Beets-Proper C-
262/84 [1986] or Schönheit and Becker C-4/02 and C-5/02 [2003]). Finally, interview 
partners mentioned the entrepreneurial capacity of the Commissioner heading DG°EMPL at 
the time.  
While market inefficiencies were invoked in this internal debate, the core ambition of the 
drafting DG clearly was to alter the quality of this market along a political reasoning targeting 
greater equality. Enhancing the efficiency of markets by responding to changing 
environments and countering unfair practices was on the agenda of the Commission, 
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especially in view of persisting implementation difficulties (COM125:47). When proposing 
the more recent act Commissioner Spidla is cited to have said that ‘prejudice, a reason for 
discrimination, is costing us a great deal!’ (AE 2007). However, we also note clearly voiced 
criticism that the opposite would be the case under the envisaged regulation. Stephen Sklaroff, 
deputy director general of the association of British insurers, stressed: ‘If you tell an industry 
that it must behave in a less efficient and less transparent way, which is what this would do, it 
will have an adverse effect on that industry's competitiveness’ (cited in Minder 2003b). 
Similarly, the FT claimed that the ‘[a]mbitious move to enshrine 'respect for human dignity' 
could force up premiums’ (Parker 2003). Besides the fact that re-regulation would not 
necessarily increase efficiency in a narrow sense, the goal to increase equality in markets was 
also voiced explicitly by the Commission. The proposal is described in official documents as 
a necessary ‘signal of solidarity between women and men in European society’ (Secrétariat 
Général 2003:21) and as the ‘result of a real moral and legal obligation’ (proposal, p.4). 
Commissioner Diamantopoulou stressed that there were ‘political reasons for not accepting 
gender as an element justifying a differentiation of the treatment of individuals in the access 
to the supply of goods and services’ as well as the signalling function of the act for European 
society (Secrétariat Général 2003:21). 
A second case that is particularly insightful for the Commission’s positioning between 
efficiency- and equality-enhancing regulation is the 2002 inroad to consumer credit 
regulation.7 A supranational regulation of consumer credits exited before but it had left 
European member states with the possibility to enact more stringent rules. National 
governments had used this extensively so that a myriad of differing regulations of consumer 
credit persisted in Europe. 
For a European market in financial services, these barriers became increasingly relevant. 
Consumer credit had become the ‘lubricant of economic life’, new financial instruments such 
as product-related credits, credit cards or overdraft facilities of private accounts spread 
quickly and fuelled private consumption (COM89:31). At the time the proposal was adopted 
in the Commission, consumer credit amounted to 7% of the EU-15 GDP and exhibited a 
growing tendency (COM119:197, Commission of the European Communities 2002: 3). For 
the internal market Directorate-General of the Commission (DG MARKT), differing national 
regimes hampered growth (COM119:39) and it had been a ‘long-standing’ intention in the 
                                                 
7 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning credit for consumers – 
COM(2003)443. This proposal was meant to repeal the existing supranational law in the area as entailed in 
Directive 87/102/EEC. 
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Commission to enhance the efficiency of the consumer credit markets by removing these 
trade barriers (COM119:113; COM89:31). 
But unlike most other regulations on financial services and unlike earlier publications on 
consumer credit had indicated,8 it was not DG MARKT that signed responsible for the policy 
proposal but rather the newly established consumer policy DG SANCO. And while a lack of 
market-efficiency provided the basic justification to re-regulate the area (COM111:74), this 
Commission department pursued aims going way beyond the facilitation of cross-border 
trade. 
In fact, SANCO officials aimed at protecting the ‘weak consumer’ (COM89:82). Drafting was 
based on the assumption that the consumer taking a credit was not able to capture the 
implications of credit agreements fully and thus needs to be protected against the exploitation 
of that very fact by the banking or retail industry (COM89:86). This position was informed by 
observing individual cases of immensely overindebted consumers (COM89:110) but also by 
the ‘buzz word’ of ‘behavioural economics’, a line of research that delves into the non-
rationality of individual decisions and corresponding disadvantages in free markets 
(COM89:82). This deviation from a mere efficiency-enhancing perspective was also 
important for the comparably young DG SANCO in building its own portfolio profile. 
The resulting re-distributive ‘ambition […] to create a very comprehensive, very exhaustive 
consumer credit regulation which would be burdensome for industry’ was in fact combined 
with market-making considerations (COM89:46). To this end, the SANCO drafting unit 
evaluated the extant national regulations and picked the most stringent approaches they could 
find for each issue. Particularly the highly protective Belgian law served as a role model here 
(ibid.). In fact, SANCO proposed the highest available level of consumer protection rather 
than harmonising at the lowest common denominator.  
While a detailed analysis of the encompassing proposal would exceed the scope of this article, 
the results of SANCO’s equality-enhancing approach can be highlighted along some of its key 
provisions. Especially the principle of responsible lending was contested. It fully obliged 
creditors to assess before the agreement whether the consumer is actually able to bear the 
credit obligations (Commission of the European Communities 2002: article 9). The banking 
industry was shocked, feared that this principle would lead to an increase of litigations against 
credit providers and argued that it is predominantly the prerogative of the consumer to assess 
whether he or she needs the credit and can bear the respective obligations (ESBG 2003: 7-9). 
                                                 
8 Both a Green Paper in May 1996 (COM(96)209) and a follow-up paper in June 1997 entitled "Financial 
Services: Enhancing Consumer Confidence" (COM(97)309) were drafted in MARKT, while DG SANCO 
merely assisted. 
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Clearly, the banking sector started from the assumption of a fully rational consumer rather 
than from the underprivileged, weak market participant SANCO officials had in mind. 
Consumer associations, in contrast, were very satisfied with the protection offered by the 
Commission proposal. Along the same lines, the responsible lending principle stirred internal 
conflict with DG MARKT (COM89:82; COM90:40). 
Another heatedly contested issue was the way in which the total cost of credit are 
communicated to the consumer (COM89:30) which was encapsulated in the proposal’s 
provision on the annual percentage rate (APR). Compared to the extant directive, the SANCO 
proposal included a range of additional cost elements creditors must consider in the 
calculation. This involved also third party costs such as notary fees or even insurance 
premiums meaning that the creditor must disclose a set of cost that go beyond his or her own 
control. Particularly this rule highlights that SANCO went for a regulatory approach of direct 
and conclusive rules governing the market. The banking industry defied this as ‘unworkable’ 
(ESBG 2003: 10) and also DG MARKT argued for a ‘narrow sort of box of cost elements’ 
(COM89:82). Here DG SANCO’s strategic pick-and-choose from more stringent national 
rules became visible. The fact that APR calculation had been subject to minimum 
harmonisation ‘prompted a number of Member States to regulate this area beyond the 
requirements of the directive.’ In contrast, the new directive should include them as well in 
order to fight market fragmentation (Commission of the European Communities 2002: 5-6). 
At first sight, this reasoning resembles the typical efficiency-based arguments for full 
harmonisation. Yet, it differs in an interesting respect. Rather than taking the lowest common 
denominator or trying to strike a balance between extant national protection regimes, 
DG°SANCO relied only on those regimes with the highest level of consumer protection as the 
benchmark for justifying the position taken in the regulatory proposal. 
Harmonisation on the highest level of protection is finally underlined by the provision on joint 
and several liability in credits linked to particular consumer goods. It basically renders any 
creditor equally liable for defective products purchased on credit (Commission of the 
European Communities 2002: article 19). The principle was largely a transfer of the so-called 
Section 75 law of the UK Consumer Credit Act. It was thought as protecting the consumer 
against the risk of paying debt for faulty products (COM89:37) but was also a valuable 
advertising tool that boosted the consumer credit market in the UK (COM89:37). Yet, in other 
European regimes, the idea of creditor liability was ‘totally outlandish’ (COM89:41) and the 
banking industry ‘strongly opposed’ because ‘lenders intervene neither in choosing the 
merchant or seller, nor the product, nor concluding the transaction’ and can accordingly not 
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be held responsible (ESBG 2003: 12). Again, SANCO largely ignored these claims and stuck 
with the most stringent rule it could find among the member state regimes. European 
consumer associations applauded (EURO COOP 2003; also BEUC 2002: 14-5) while 
DG MARKT criticized the liability rules as ‘something not very easy to justify and rationalize 
as to why a credit card provider should do that’ (COM119:62). 
Similar logics can be found for other provisions in the proposal. In sum, SANCO proposed a 
regulation that was geared along equal protection for consumers in the European market. Yet, 
this regulation could come about only because inefficiencies persisted in that market before. 
They provided the basic justification for regulation but the intentional focus on weak market 
participants and SANCO’s need to delineate its competences from the internal market DG 
resulted in a proposal that clearly aims to re-distribute rights along an equality-enhancing 
motivation. Not the least, the high level of protection entailed in the regulation was driven by 
the political clout of protecting consumers in credit markets. Merely enhancing efficiency by 
removing regulatory barriers would ‘deliver a bad message’ politically and would be ‘a very 
difficult position for the Commission’ to be in (COM119:61). 
The clear focus on only one societal segment was also mirrored in interest group access. It is 
important to note that stakeholder meetings indicated a ‘clear desire’ from the consumer 
associations (COM111:80) as well as ‘unanimous’ opposition from the industry side. In 
response to this outright industry disagreement, ‘further consultation was entirely avoided’ by 
DG SANCO (ESBG 2003: 2-3) so that ‘the industry felt that it had been very much 
disregarded in the process’ (COM119:88). This neo-pluralist and intentionally skewed interest 
group involvement also affected internal interaction with DG MARKT which ‘had more the 
ear […] to the banking sector’ (COM111:96). MARKT officials felt that banking interests 
were ‘not being properly consulted’ (COM119:85) which pushed the Directors-General of 
both DGs to the drafting table early on (COM119:127) and resulted in a blockade of the 
formal interservice consultation. As was the case for the directive on anti-discrimination these 
more fundamental questions were subject to exchange among Cabinets and Commissioners 
about the quality of markets so that ‘in the end it is a political decision’ (COM89:119). 
Rather than enhancing market efficiency also this case is more consistent with an equality 
enhancing perspective. Redistribution of rights among producers and consumers was an aim 
rather a constraint, detailed rules rather than self-regulation along pre-defined objectives were 
pre-scribed, and a neo-pluralist style of communicating with external stakeholder contacts 
coincided with a political bargaining process among the relevant regulatory actors. 
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4. Conclusions 
The empirical cases show that regulatory decision-making in the Commission may follow an 
equality-enhancing perspective on regulation and thereby take a middle ground in between 
traditional welfare state models and purely efficiency focussed regulation. Against this view, 
neither the neo-liberal deregulation of Europe’s internal market nor its social embedment can 
be considered as the automatisms that much of the contemporaneous writing implies. Rather 
we require a view on the powers of involved actors – across but especially also within 
European institutions. So what does the comparison of these two policy formulation processes 
tell us about factors that push the Commission position towards an equality- rather than an 
efficiency-enhancing perspective?  
In both cases, prevailing inefficiencies in the European Single Market were the starting point 
of policy formulation and it appears to be relevant that the respectively favoured societal 
group can be framed as an active participant in that market.  
Initially, both cases were driven by the agency of actors within the Commission. The 
precondition is that inside the Commission efficiency enhancement is always pursued by 
some, and not by others. To answer the question whether we can expect Brussels to intervene 
only where markets fail or also where social interests demand regulation, we accordingly need 
a disaggregated view on the Commission. On the one hand, this refers to entrepreneurial 
actors in the drafting DGs. But for both cases it was important for the Directorates-General 
that they held a decidedly social mandate and could rely on treaty bases justified along 
equality-enhancing lines. Delineating their own competences from traditionally economic 
DGs, the former interests within the lead departments explain why they wanted to push for 
more equality, while the latter institutional resource explains why they could pursue this aim. 
Yet, the institutional resources were not enough. In both processes the leading DGs could 
draw on the support of consumer associations or the broad coalition of anti-discrimination 
NGOs – thus deviating substantially from both involvement of only economic actors or 
involvement of corporatist actors as classically the case for EU social regulation or national 
welfare states. In the two cases this was successfully - yet, the need to frame beneficiaries as 
market participants may limit the scope of European re-regulation if we compare it to national 
polities where social policy often specifically targets those not able to participate in markets. 
Linked to this, another observation is that equality enhancement means in the Commission 
context a re-distribution of rights rather than resources. This is interesting and might be worth 
further pursuing in different regards. In a positive account the fundamental rights agenda is by 
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many seen as completing the political union. Given the institutional difficulties in the EU to 
conclude positive integration steps further aggravated by the increasing heterogeneity 
individual rights provide for much better opportunities since they cut across traditional 
conflict lines. What is more they might be a piece in the puzzle to make the EU loveable (to 
allude to the famous phrase by Delors that ‘you cannot love a market’). From a more critical 
perspective the shift towards individual rights might question the traditional logic of welfare 
provision in the ‘positive’ state which can be characterized as provided through social 
security, involving corporatist actors and supported by macroeconomic stabilisation (in turn 
embedded in respective historically rooted beliefs and norms). In a nutshell individual rights 
aim at increasing the autonomy of citizens in a market setting but they may endanger the 
notion of solidarity across social groups. In times where most western societies are 
characterized by ever growing disparities this might be a fatale development - even more so, 
where individual rights undermine the very institutions that are crucial for their 
implementation such as trade unions or financial capacity for redistribution (Schmidt 2012, 
forthcoming). 
In sum, our inductive comparison implies the following argument: With distributive roads 
closed for social policy at EU level, actors interested in pursuing broader societal goals are 
increasingly forced to a detour via market efficiency. Put differently, while in many member 
states classical social policy sought to de-commodify individuals from the market, EU 
regulatory policy reflects interests of actors to change process and outcome of market 
transactions. In conclusion, there is a scope for a social embedding of the European internal 
market in principle but it is strictly constrained by its institutional foundation, the existence of 
pro-active agents within the Commission, a focus on market participants, and by the mere re-
distribution of rights rather than resources. Accordingly it remains debateable to which extent 
the Commission under the Community method can counter-balance the pressures the internal 
market has put on the distributional agreements in the national markets of EU member states. 
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